

# Exhibit 2-8

on the ship's side. Lt. Commander Pinchasi checked the marking in a "Janes" manual and learned that the reference was to the intelligence-ship named "Liberty". He reported the information to Naval Operations Section/3 and since the reference was to an intelligence ship he likewise reported to Naval Operations Section/4 (Intelligence)<sup>11</sup>.

Commander Lunz had relieved the Head of Naval Operations section/3 (who retired to rest) and was the officer who received the report. However, he did not see anything new in the debriefing but rather a complementary report to the one received at 0500 hours. Since he did not have information as to the present location of the "Liberty" he gave the order (at 1100 hours) to erase the vessel from the CCC control table. This order was given in accordance with the accepted updating procedure for maintaining an up-to-the minute picture at the CCC control table.<sup>12</sup>

By this action, the "Liberty" was, for all practical purposes, removed from the agenda. The detection of the "Liberty" at that location (far from the theatre of battle) was not unusual and did not require special attention or tracking. Certainly no danger was discerned that might have necessitated a response and it was reasonable to assume that the ship would turn round and sail away. In addition, it was common practice to erase targets which had disappeared from range.<sup>13</sup> These were almost certainly the considerations which guided commander Lunz when he ordered the erasure of "Liberty" from the CCC control-table.<sup>14</sup>

A short time after the erasure of "Liberty" from the CCC control table, a series of events transpired which led to the detection of the ship a second time now under circumstances which led to a tragic mistake.

#### REPORT ON THE SHELLING OF EL-ARISH AND DISPATCHING OF THE TORPEDO BOATS.

At 1124 hours, the naval representative at Air Command reported to Naval Operation Section/3, on the shelling of El-Arish from the sea. Commander Lunz passed on the report to Chief of Naval Operations, Captain (Navy) Rahav, and he in turn instructed Lt. Commander Pinchasi, in no uncertain terms, to check the source of the report.<sup>15</sup>

The inquiry into the source of the report was ordered because of the many reports which had been received concerning shelling from the sea and which were later proven to be false. The feeling was that this report was probably no different. Lt. Commander Pinchasi was told by Air Operations Section/3